December 4, 2024
JAKARTA – As a foreign policy-focused president, President Prabowo Subianto has made it clear that for the next five years, Indonesia will stand out in anticipating and resolving rising global tensions in many parts of the world, such as in the Indo-Pacific, more specifically in the South China Sea (SCS). China is becoming more assertive in forcing its unilateral claims on nearly all resource-rich marine areas in Southeast Asia. Neighbors expect the new President to continue in a leadership role, including facing China as his predecessor did.
The 10 ASEAN members must adjust to the military buildup of the United States and its allies. China also has problems that overlap with Japan and South Korea. Meanwhile, North Korean leader Kim Jong-un continues to make nuclear war threats against Japan, South Korea and the US. It can be just a matter of time before the military rivalry expands to the Malacca Strait, one of the world’s busiest sea lanes.
However, Indonesia is likely to lose its credibility, especially among countries with overlapping claims on the SCS like Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines and Vietnam. The joint statement of Prabowo and Xi Jinping, which was issued after their bilateral summit in Beijing on Nov. 9, implied that Indonesia recognizes China’s nine-dash line map. Indonesia is not a claimant to the SCS but also faces the aggressive presence of Chinese naval vessels and fishermen in the North Natuna Sea.
According to Article 5 of Law No 43/2008 on state borders, Indonesia has direct land borders with Malaysia, New Papua Guinea and Timor Leste, and sea borders with Singapore, the Philippines, Vietnam, Australia, India and Thailand. Indonesia does not have any border with China.
The 1982 United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) recognizes Indonesia’s 200 miles of exclusive economic zone (EEZ). The UN rejects China’s claim on the SCS and its nine (now 10) dash-line map. So, where does the problem of overlapping claims come from?
Prabowo and Xi agreed to jointly develop waters where the two countries have overlapping claims. It is a politically binding agreement, and therefore, President Prabowo should explain to his ASEAN colleagues and our nation what is going on with the joint statement. The policy change, if real, will damage Indonesia’s credibility in the international community.
Our neighbors have the right to know the actual situation from Prabowo himself. Did Indonesia change its position on the SCS and its UN-recognized sovereign rights to the Natuna Sea? From a media perspective, it is indeed a political blunder if Indonesia is making concessions regarding its EEZ to China.
I suggested that the President make an introductory visit to all ASEAN countries except Myanmar. He did visit them before he officially replaced President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo on Oct. 20. He explained to them his position and why he agreed with the joint statement.
Indonesia should never forget its role in ASEAN. Neighbors regard Indonesia as their “primus inter pares.”
During the last 10 years under Jokowi, Indonesia tended to be inward-looking and preferred transactional foreign policy practices. But traditionally, Indonesia also enjoys a high posture among developing countries – the so-called Global South – and positions itself as a natural representative of developing nations, mostly grouped in the Non-Aligned Movement. And ASEAN is traditionally treated as the cornerstone of Indonesia’s diplomacy.
However, Indonesia has the 16th largest economy in the world and is part of the G20, and Jakarta is confident that it will move further from the region in its diplomatic efforts. The country is internationally recognized as a global middle power along with other countries in the Asia-Pacific such as Australia, South Korea and Japan. While the other three countries are allies of the US, Indonesia only has strategic partnerships with the four countries. Jakarta tries to distance itself from power rivalries but realizes that part of being “free and active” means having “a foot in both camps”.
Indonesia also regards itself as a sub-regional superpower in Southeast Asia and a de facto leader of ASEAN. With Indonesia’s influence, ASEAN follows Indonesia’s free and active principle on foreign policy, especially in facing the rivalry between China and the US.
Indonesia, and ASEAN in general, tend to quietly agree with the rising military presence of the US and its allies and strategic partners such as Japan, Australia, South Korea and some NATO members to counter-balance the more assertive China. Establishing loose security cooperation between the US, Japan, India and Australia (Quad) and the official military pact between Australia, the United Kingdom and the US (AUKUS) is only disliked by ASEAN on the surface.
The Indo-Pacific covers a vast area but is more limited to the SCS and Malacca Strait for ASEAN. Officially, in public, all countries support the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP) and expect ASEAN to play a crucial role in the region. As a middle power, Indonesia is positioned to lead the regional grouping in “rowing between two reefs.” However, many countries are ganging up to fight against China.
Prabowo feels closer to the West, but he is also realistic in that he has little choice but to choose China for his economic interests. However, this does not mean that Indonesia is ready to compromise on the Natuna Sea.
It is timely that the President brief his regional counterparts in their capital cities as a part of his introductory visit to ASEAN countries. Please get to it.