November 27, 2024
SEOUL – North Korea may officially acknowledge its troop deployments to Russia to secure strategic gains by formalizing its role as an official war participant amid mounting internal challenges in concealing such actions, the Unification Ministry in Seoul said Tuesday.
The ministry suggested Seoul detected “signs of unease” within North Korean society, as rumors, including accounts of families in tears, have surfaced and spread despite Pyongyang’s efforts to keep its troop deployment to Russia under wraps internally.
The ministry warned that as the war drags on, it will become increasingly difficult for the Kim regime to conceal its troop deployments for two key reasons.
“Casualties and deserters on the battlefield in Russia, combined with the growing burden of troop rotations, are expected to raise the likelihood of these issues resonating within North Korea,” a senior official said during a closed-door briefing, speaking on condition of anonymity.
“North Korea might consider scenarios where it becomes virtually impossible to keep its troop dispatch undisclosed or where it chooses to formalize the deployment during occasions such as the exchange of instruments of ratification on the new treaty.”
North Korean leader Kim Jong-un and Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a treaty in June to establish a comprehensive strategic partnership, which includes mutual defense commitments. Both countries finalized the ratification process earlier this month. The treaty officially takes effect upon the exchange of instruments of ratification between North Korea and Russia.
The Unification Ministry official suggested that if the Kim regime chooses to formalize its troop deployment rather than suppressing internal rumors, it likely calculates that the strategic advantages in diplomacy and security arenas of being recognized as an official participant in the Ukraine war outweigh the risks and potential repercussions.
“First, North Korea likely anticipates that its war participation would cement and institutionalize its military alliance with Russia even after the war ends. Second, Pyongyang may expect its strategic standing to be elevated in the post-war landscape,” the unnamed official said.
“Lastly, while less direct, North Korea might also see its ties with Russia as a potential asset in improving its approach toward the United States, should future circumstances allow for such a shift.”
Additionally, North Korea likely anticipates both military and economic gains from its troop deployment. These would include acquiring combat experience and operational data on weapon systems to support its military modernization, potentially gaining access to advanced military technologies, earning wages for its deployed soldiers and bolstering bilateral economic ties by circumventing UN sanctions.
The Unification Ministry assessed that the 4th Conference of Battalion Commanders and Political Instructors of the Korean People’s Army, held on Nov. 14-15, was a “preemptive measure to block and manage potential unrest within the military.”
Casualties among North Korean troops and the spread of information regarding their deployment could stir up dissatisfaction within the military, according to the unnamed official.
Kim Jong-un delivered a speech on the final day of the conference, urging full combat readiness and unwavering allegiance to his regime while emphasizing the ideological and spiritual indoctrination of his forces. Kim also portrayed the Ukraine war as the beginning of a broader global military intervention by the US and Western powers, likening trilateral cooperation among South Korea, the US and Japan to NATO, and blaming NATO for causing a security crisis in Europe.
The Unification Ministry also noted that the three previous conferences of battalion commanders and political instructors in North Korea’s armed forces were convened “at junctures where reinforcing military unity was deemed necessary.”
Military conferences have convened only three times in North Korea’s history prior to the latest one: in October 1953, October 3-4, 2006, and November 3-4, 2014.
The first took place following the end of the 1950-53 Korean War, the second days before North Korea’s first nuclear test on Oct. 9, 2006, and the third during Kim Jong-un’s consolidation of power following the December 2013 purge of Jang Song-thaek, who was then widely regarded as the second-most powerful figure in the regime.