October 22, 2024
ISLAMABAD – BOB Woodward writes the ultimate ‘insider’ accounts about American presidents, politics and foreign policy. He is one of the duo of journalists who exposed the Watergate scandal that led to president Richard Nixon’s downfall.
Woodward has long enjoyed unique access to America’s top political and military leaders. Which is why he is sometimes unflatteringly described as an ’“access journalist” who shows undue deference to his main, often anonymous sources.
His latest book, War, belongs to the same genre as earlier works and is based on scores of interviews offering insights into the highest levels of decision-making during Joe Biden’s presidency. What gives this book added significance is its publication on the eve of the American presidential election, as he draws comparisons between Donald Trump and Biden in how they dealt with international crises.
Woodward considers Trump as “the most reckless and impulsive president in American history”, who “is demonstrating the very same character as a presidential candidate in 2024”. He, therefore, deems Trump to be unfit for a second term in office. These views are no different from what Woodward previously wrote in his trilogy of books on the Trump presidency. The first two, titled Fear and Rage, were about the chaos in the Trump White House and depicted the former president as a self-obsessed, ill-informed and impetuous leader.
The principal focus of his new book is on how the Biden administration handled the wars in Ukraine and Gaza, although Woodward’s disclosures about Trump’s relationship with Russian President Vladimir Putin — sending him Covid test kits when they were scarce at home — attracted greater pre-publication publicity for the book. War covers all these international engagements, but perhaps it is how the American exit from Afghanistan was botched up that might interest readers most in Pakistan.
For Biden, the 20-year US military presence in Afghanistan was “a classic case of mission creep” that he pledged in his election campaign to end. The mission had lost its purpose and direction and as vice president he warned president Barack Obama that he was being fed “bullshit” by military generals who were taking advantage of his inexperience. When Biden became president, he inherited the 2020 Doha agreement Trump concluded with the Taliban, which committed the US to withdraw from Afghanistan by May 2021.
Three options were presented to Biden: stay on indefinitely, undertake a slower, “gated” withdrawal, or pull out quickly and safely. Like Trump, he wanted an expeditious out, and accordingly announced that in April 2021. Criticism followed from former military officials, and even ex-president George Bush. Biden remained undeterred. His administration, however, “failed to anticipate contingencies and plan for worst-case scenarios”, says Woodward. It was taken by surprise by how swiftly the country fell to the Taliban without a fight.
Blaming the Afghan government and military for the debacle, Biden, however, stood by his decision while also passing the buck to Trump, saying he forged the original deal with the Taliban. None of this obscured the monumental intelligence failure that produced the chaotic exit, which had echoes of the US scramble from Vietnam. This inevitably damaged America’s global standing and credibility.
The chapters on the war in Gaza portray a frustrated US president, angry with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his constant lies about his intention to escalate the conflict, which Biden saw as inextricably linked to his political survival. “Defined by distrust”, their tense relationship is described in graphic detail. Woodward cites several occasions when Washington’s advice was willfully ignored, including on a ceasefire deal, Israel’s invasion of Rafah, siege of Gaza, air strikes on Beirut, and on avoiding civilian casualties. He quotes Biden as telling Netanyahu that “the perception of Israel around the world increasingly is that you’re a rogue state, a rogue actor”. He cites Biden’s frequent use of four-letter words for the Israeli leader.
Biden wanted to contain the war to Gaza and, according to Woodward, told Netanyahu that the US is “not on board” on any preemptive attack on Hezbollah. He also told him Washington would not participate in any Israeli offensive action against Iran. He was concerned that 45,000 US military personnel and contractors stationed across the Middle East would become targets of attack. The book details heated arguments between Biden and Netanyahu over humanitarian assistance for Gaza. The Israeli leader repeatedly responded to this by saying he will not allow “a drop or ounce to go into Gaza to help the people”. Netanyahu’s refusal to listen to Biden and unwillingness to provide urgent access for aid meant Washington failed to avert a humanitarian catastrophe in Gaza.
Despite their many disagreements on the conduct of the war, Biden remained steadfast in his support of Israel. Whatever Woodward’s explanation of his inability to prevent Israel from escalating and broadening the war, this failure was a reflection of Washington’s strategic compulsion to avoid a rupture with Tel Aviv as well as the limits of a tired superpower’s eroding leverage, with a manipulative Netanyahu getting the better of a lame-duck Biden.
The role of key Arab states is highlighted in anecdotes of several meetings. For example, King Abdullah of Jordan tells US Secretary of State Antony Blinken, “We want Israel to defeat Hamas.” Similarly, the UAE ruler conveys to the Americans that “Hamas must be eliminated”. Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman says to Blinken in discussions on a future Palestinian state “Do I want it? It doesn’t matter that much. Do I need it? Absolutely”. Significantly, though, he added he would never betray the Arab or Muslim world on this issue.
The war in Ukraine also receives detailed treatment. The most striking disclosure concerns US intelligence information in September 2022 that Putin was considering using tactical nuclear weapons, and efforts by the Biden national security team to stop him. Direct US warnings to Russian officials are claimed by the book to have averted the danger of nuclear escalation.
Whether or not one agrees with many of Woodward’s assessments and conclusions, this is a compelling, must-read book for its rich detail and insights into decision-making at the top echelons of the US government in times of war and crisis.